Keith Mathison, Towards A Reformed Apologetics: A Critique of the Thought of Cornelius Van Til, Reformed, Reformed Exegetical Doctrinal Studies (Fearn: Mentor, 2024).
Most of Cornelius Van Til’s works were published between the 1950s and 1970s. From the beginning there were critiques, engagements and sometimes heated debates. As Van Til had employed the language of philosophical idealism charges of adopting idealism as a philosophy were raised early, refuted and then re-asserted. But in more recent times there has been little in the way of a holistic, systematic, philosophical and thoroughly biblical critique.[1] Yet in recent years the mounting concerns with Van Til’s exclusive methodology have taken on a new shape.[2]
Why did it take so long to get to a fuller assessment?
Reviewing developments in the last ten to fifteen years provides a possible answer. In this period there has been a revival of significant aspects of historic Reformed theology and methodology in contemporary Reformed theology, which has enabled a more thorough critique. Here are four of the most pertinent developments.
First, the resurgence of Classical theism with its more robust doctrine of the Trinity and the being and nature of God. This has called for more rigorous philosophical analysis requiring a better knowledge of the skills and tools needed to grapple with classical theology. Connected to Classical theism has been a new Protestant and Reformed interest in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Whilst this risks becoming another bandwagon, it has nurtured a more rigorous interest in philosophy, metaphysics and the tools necessary for a sustainable critique of the trajectory and weaknesses in Van Til’s epistemology and apologetic method.
Secondly, the invaluable work of Richard Muller, gathering a more complete view of the features and methodology of post-Reformation Reformed Orthodoxy, has led to an avalanche of studies that have furthered our understanding of the philosophical and theological background to the post-Reformation period. This has enabled a deeper appreciation for the impact of some of Van Til’s proposals, as well as his trenchant criticism of the philosophical realism of the period in which our confessional standards were formulated.
Thirdly, there has been the renewed interest in natural law,[3] something that Van Til spoke of in strongly negative terms. The modern questions of secular morality, postmodernism and relativism have driven many back in search of a deeper and more historically Reformed and orthodox assessment of the value of natural law in the full matrix of our understanding of the law and morality. The Reconstructionist movement did interesting work in biblical law, but consciously not within the Reformed orthodox framework of natural, divine, moral and human law.
Finally, another milestone has been the translation of the dogmatics of Herman Bavinck. This translation project made accessible to English readers the extended discussion of dogmatics by the leading Dutch neo-Calvinist theologian of the 20th century. His method and classical mode were evident, even as he displayed a vast understanding of the modern and contemporary thought of his time.
Outline
This is the background, in my opinion, to Mathison’s new book: Towards A Reformed Apologetics. Mathison’s assessment of Van Til is divided into two halves.
The first half aims to be a dispassionate description of Van Til’s method stressing Van Til’s theory of knowledge. Chapters in the first half cover are a descriptive summary of Van Til on the trinity and doctrine of God, creation and revelation, fall and grace, redemption and the antithesis, and the apologetic implications of the antithesis. Mathison says in the preface that he peer-reviewed this section with leading presuppositionalists like Frame and Anderson, which is a highly commendable approach. His summary seems accurate and fair based on my own reading of many of Van Til’s works.
The second half of the volume then critiques Van Til’s position across five themed sections: biblical, philosophical, theological, historical and practical.
Biblical Critique
Mathison claims that Van Til’s method contradicts the examples of apologetics found in Scripture. The Bible assumes that nonbelievers can understand truth statements, at least to some degree. It also presents miracles as evidence that authenticates the truth (Mathison cites Exodus 4). Furthermore, the transcendental argument (i.e., that God is the presupposition of all thought) is never deployed in Scripture (which of course does not automatically invalidate it!). Furthermore, 1 John 1:1-4 states that sense-experience of the historical witness of the incarnate and resurrected Christ is the basis for apostolic credibility. It is what was seen, touched, manifested that is to believed .
Philosophical Critique
Mathison revisits the critique of Van Til’s dependence on idealism and dissects the influences on Van Til’s method. Here Mathison is more precise than earlier criticisms of Van Til. His main concern stems from Van Til’s engagement with 19th century British idealist philosophers, who claimed that one must know everything to truly know any one fact. This is the precise issue with his adoption of idealism: not the desire to speak the language of his contemporaries, but epistemic holism, which entails that every fact is connected to every other fact. Van Til implants this view into his system and, in place of the philosophers’ appeal to the Absolute, offers the omniscient Triune God as the solution. Therefore, for Van Til, true knowledge comes from interpreting the facts according to God’s revelation. But non-believers cannot do this, because their knowledge is built on their own autonomy.
Mathison offers a threefold critique of idealist holism. (1) The Bible does not teach it. Throughout Scripture, finite human knowledge is treated as valid knowledge. (2) The need for comprehensive knowledge in order to know anything at all unwittingly introduces the possibility of scepticism – is true knowledge ever available to creatures? Van Til claims to solve this problem in that if finite humans reason analogically according to God’s revelation, then knowledge is possible. But does this mean that non-believers have no valid knowledge of anything? Here Van Til appeals to common grace to avoid the charge of scepticism. But it is unclear how this helps, as common grace does not give comprehensive knowledge. When Van Til states that unbelievers have no true knowledge, but also that they have true knowledge ‘as far as it goes’, he is either contradicting himself, or equivocating over the meaning of ‘knowledge’. If he were consistent in holding that they do have some knowledge ‘as far as it goes’, he would simply be repeating the mainstream Reformed confessional position (and the view of Aquinas!) on natural knowledge and the ‘common notions’ shared by believers and unbelievers alike. But then presuppositionalism would not be the only true Reformed apologetics (3). Van Til’s idealism is a departure from Reformed Orthodox epistemology. His rejection of realism, claims Mathison, ‘will eventually result in the revising of Reformed theology’ (165), because Van Til has shifted the philosophical basis towards a new epistemology based on epistemic holism.
Theological Critique
In this chapter Mathison discusses Van Til’s views on natural theology, the antithesis and the Trinity. Drawing on Nicene trinitarianism, Mathison mounts a devastating analysis of Van Til’s eccentric claim that God is one Person and three persons. And he argues that Van Til’s critique of Reformed Orthodoxy undermines his commitment to the very Reformed confessional standards he sites as his assumed theological platform for his apologetic method.
Historical Critique
Van Til’s handling of historical sources is often superficial, relying on generalisations which lead to inaccurate portrayals of figures such as Thomas Aquinas, Calvin and the Calvinists, etc. This has been demonstrated by Richard Muller, amongst others.[4] Van Til spent most of his career defending the faith against forms of liberalism and neo-orthodoxy, yet when handling older writers his knowledge of the sources appears to be of secondhand stereotypes and therefore prone to distorted generalisations.
Practical Critique
Finally, Mathison asks whether the innovations that have come out of Westminster Theological Seminary have borne mixed results which might in part be attributed to Van Til’s critique of Reformed Orthodoxy. Here, he particularly has in view the Jay Adams’ biblical counselling movement, and the deployment of Van Til by the Theonomists.
Observations
In conclusion, here are six further observations, building on this stimulating and helpful volume.
First, It takes time to find the problems in a new approach to theology, philosophy or methodology. Early adoption of a new position can slow down that process, as adopters become disciples and then earnest defenders, who are invested in the future of the system to which they have become wedded.
Secondly, the requisite tools for evaluation might not be available due to other intervening changes and the adoption of adjacent methodologies. All of this ought not to prevent progress, but ought it not to make us more cautious?
Thirdly, there is the psychological appeal of a totalising system that radically departs from previous approaches. Van Til did not claim his approach could supplement its predecessors, but it was designed to displace it. This prevented his arguments being added to the existing approaches, even calling for their adjustment and amendment.
Fourthly, presuppositionalism lends itself to an unhealthy biblicism. This can be seen in the biblicist leanings in Reconstructionism and Jay Adam’s biblical counselling movement , both of which were self-consciously Van Tillian.
Fifthly, because of its accent on the antithesis, presuppositionalism leans towards binary thinking, and it can be superficial in handling complex issues. It is the ideal methodology for the culture war mentality, at least in terms of its psychological appeal! The mood and mode of presuppositionalism has led in some to an inflexibility and a doctrinaire approach. Many of us have encountered ‘movement Van Tillians’!
Sixthly, we should also ask what presuppositionalism gets right. Presuppositionalism grasps that underlying beliefs and commitments, for individuals and cultures, shape worldviews. But this insight is not unique to Van Til – he inherited it from his Dutch neo-Calvinist heritage. One may be presuppositionally aware without being committed to a fully Van Tillian method. So, is there a way to integrate the good insights of Presuppositionalism with the Reformed classical heritage? In many ways, Timothy Keller did this in his two apologetics books, The Reason for God and Making Sense of God.[5] Both bear the marks of neo-Calvinism, but are also comfortable with careful and probing use of evidential arguments. Perhaps an additional chapter on this might have rounded off nicely an excellent book.
Conclusion
This is not a time to excoriate Van Til, delete his legacy or dismiss everything without discernment – and Mathison does not suggest this. But now is a time for assessment and to learn how to formulate an apologetic that is classical, modern and neo-Calvinist, one faithful to our confessions suited to the challenges of today.
Steve Hayhow is Minister of Emmanuel Church North London
[1] E.g., R. C. Sproul, John H. Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984).
[2] David Haines, ed., Without Excuse: Scripture, Reason, and Presuppositional Apologetics (s.l.: Davenant Press, 2020).
[3] Especially the work of the Davenant Institute.
[4] Richard A. Muller, Review of Thomas Aquinas by K. Scott Oliphint, foreword by Michael A. G. Haykin (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2017). reformation21.org/articles/aquinas-reconsidered.php
[5] Timothy Keller, The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Scepticism (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2009); Timothy Keller, Making Sense of God: An Invitation to the Sceptical (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2018).
